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Inducement Liability for Copyright
Infringement is Born: The Supreme Court
Attempts to Remedy the Law's Broken Leg
With a Cast on the Arm
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, a technology finm discovered a process in which an audio com-
pact disk ("CD") could be copied onto a computer hard drive.2 Although this
process, colloquially known as "ripping,, 3 is now an afterthought, it was a
novel idea at its inception. The ripping process creates an MP3, which is a
compressed audio computer file that can be rapidly transmitted from one
computer to another by any method of electronic file transfer, such as e-mail.4
One of the first companies to seize on the potential profitability of rip-
ping was Napster. 5 Napster distributed free computer software that enabled
users to share ripped MP3s with one another.6 Napster derived substantial
profits solely from advertisers attempting to reach its 32 million users.7 Un-
fortunately for Napster, the vast majority of files transferred with its software
were protected by copyright.8 Accordingly, several record companies sued
Napster for copyright infringement. 9 Ultimately, the record companies pre-
vailed, and Napster went out of business.'0
1. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).





7. See id. at 1023.
8. Id. at 1013-14.
9. Id. at 1010-11.
10. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2773
(2005) [hereinafter MGM v. Grokster, Ltd]. Today, Napster actually remains in busi-
ness, although not in the form in existence at that time.
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In the wake of Napster's demise, several software companies emerged,
intending to capitalize on the high demand for free software that would en-
able users to access copyrighted music.'3 Grokster, Ltd. ("Grokster") and
StreamCast Networks, Inc. ("StreamCast") were two such software compa-
nies that, like Napster, were eventually sued for copyright infringement by
numerous entertainment industry copyright holders.' 2 In Metro-Godwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,'3 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify
when a product distributor could be held liable for the infinging acts of a
third party that used its product.1 4 This note argues that although the Supreme
Court's decision introduced a beneficial new standard for liability, it left
long-standing ambiguities in precedent unresolved.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Grokster and StreamCast distributed free software that enabled their us-
ers to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks.15 The beneficial
features of peer-to-peer networks have led universities, government agencies,
corporations, libraries, and other entities to employ them to store and distrib-
ute electronic files. 16 Personal computer users, such as those who used Grok-
ster's and StreamCast's software in the instant case, also use peer-to-peer
networks to share electronic files.' 7 But unlike other peer-to-peer network
users, personal computer users commonly enlist the networks to share copy-
righted music and video files without authorization. 18 Such activity was the
root of the instant litigation, in which a group of music and video copyright
holders ("MGM") sued Grokster and StreamCast, alleging that the two com-
panies knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable users
11. See, e.g., id. at 2772.
12. Id. at 2771.
13. S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
14. Id. at 2770.
15. Id. Peer-to-peer networks have been praised for their many advantages and
have substantially grown in popularity since their inception. Id. One noted advantage
of peer-to-peer networks is that they lower the cost associated with electronic file
sharing by eliminating the need for an expensive, high-powered central computer. Id.
Peer-to-peer networks also decrease the amount of time it takes to locate and retrieve
electronic files because users can locate and retrieve a desired file from any computer
connected to the network instead of just a central computer. Id. Additionally, the
networks are lauded for increasing the security of electronic file sharing because there
is no risk that an error will occur in the central computer during the file transfer. Id.
The only major disadvantage of peer-to-peer networks is that they make it difficult to
police the content of the electronic files available on the network and the behavior of
the network users. Id. at 2770 n. 1.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2770-71.
18. Id. at 2771.
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to reproduce and distribute MGM's copyrighted works in violation of the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 1332. 9
Both Grokster's and StreamCast's software enabled users to share files
directly between their computers and the computers of other network users.
20
Neither company used a central computer to intercept the content of a user
search request or mediate the file transfers between their software users.
21
Thus, neither Grokster nor StreamCast knew when particular files, including
those protected by MGM's copyrights, were transferred.22
MGM submitted a study indicating that approximately 90% of the files
available for download with Grokster's and StreamCast's software were
copyrighted.2 3 Other evidence revealed that well over 100 million copies of
Grokster's and StreamCast's software had been downloaded and that billions
of file transfers occurred each month, making the probable scope of copyright




Furthermore, evidence showed that both companies voiced the objective
that their software be used to download copyrighted files and that each com-
pany took steps to encourage this infringement.25 Both companies came into
existence with the intention of supplying the demand left by Napster's down-
fall. 26 StreamCast distributed software known as "OpenNap," which was de-
signed to work compatibly with the Napster program that many people had
previously employed to download copyrighted files. 27 StreamCast used the
OpenNap software to distribute updated versions of its software to be used for
the same purpose. 28 StreamCast's internal documents conveyed the com-
pany's intention to attract Napster users and to become "the next Napster."
29
19. Id. The Copyright Act is discussed infra Part III.
20. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2771. Grokster's and StreamCast's software had some
architectural differences that are irrelevant for the purposes of this Note. Id.
21. Id.




26. Id. at 2773. Napster is discussed further supra Part I and infra Part III.
27. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2772-73.
28. Id. at 2773.
29. Id. The evidence against StreamCast was very strong. See id. One internal e-
mail from a StreamCast executive stated that StreamCast's software was created "so
that when Napster pulls the plug on their free service... or if the Court orders them
shut down prior to that... we will be positioned to capture the flood of their 32 mil-
lion users that will be actively looking for an alternative." Id. (alteration in original).
One proposed advertisement claimed StreamCast was the "'#1 alternative to Napster'
and asked '[w]hen the lights went off at Napster... where did the users go?"' Id.
(alteration in original). StreamCast's chief technology officer even boisterously
claimed "[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get sued. It's the best way to
get in the new[s]." Id. (alteration in original).
2006]
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Grokster also distributed software aimed at ex-Napster users. Grokster dis-
seminated this software to Napster users by implanting internal codes in its
website that led computer users searching the internet for "Napster" to arrive
at Grokster's website. 31 The record also showed that neither company at-
tempted to filter copyrighted files from users' downloads, nor did they other-
wise police copyrighted file sharing.
32
Grokster and StreamCast conceded that, in most file transfers, their soft-
ware users directly infringed on MGM's copyrights.33 Both companies further
conceded awareness that their software was used primarily to download copy-
righted files, but noted the fact that the architecture of their software did not
give them knowledge of which files were copied and when.34 Grokster and
StreamCast argued that the decentralized nature of their peer-to-peer file shar-
ing software shielded them from liability because they lacked actual knowl-
edge of their users' infringing acts.35 The trial court agreed with this argu-
ment and granted summary judgment for Grokster and StreamCast.36
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, additionally holding that the
companies were not liable because they did not materially contribute to their
users' infringement, as it was the users themselves who searched for, shared,
and stored the infringing files with no involvement from either company after
initially providing the software. 37 The court further held that liability was
precluded because the companies' software had significant potential nonin-
fringing uses. 38 Finally, the Ninth Circuit found in favor of the defendants
because the companies did not monitor or control the use of their software,




32. Id. at 2774.
33. Id. at 2772.
34. Id. The record indicated that both Grokster and StreamCast learned of their
users' infringing activities via e-mails sent to them by users seeking assistance play-
ing copyrighted movies downloaded with their software. Id. Both parties responded to
these e-mails with guidance for the users. Id. Furthermore, MGM notified both com-
panies that 8 million of MGM's copyrighted files could be obtained using the two
companies' software. Id.
35. See id. at 2774.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2774-75. This portion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion addressed con-
tributory liability for copyright infringement. See infra Part Il.
38. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75. Many files not protected by copyright have
been transferred via peer-to-peer networks. Id. at 2772; see also infra Parts III, IV
(discussing this argument's applicability and relevance).
39. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. This portion of the Ninth Circuit's opinion
addressed vicarious liability for copyright infringement. See infra Part III.
[Vol. 71
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The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, vacated the
Ninth Circuit's decision, and remanded the case, holding that one who dis-
tributes a product with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright is
liable for a third party's infringing acts while using thejroduct, regardless of
whether the product has substantial noninfringing uses.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution gives Congress the express power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries. ' 41 Pursuant to this power, Congress enacted the Copy-
right Act,42 which protects original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression. 43 Under the Act, copyright holders are entitled to ex-
clusive rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works of, distribute copies of,
perform, and display their copyrighted work.44 Anyone who violates these
exclusive rights commits copyright infringement.
45
Two primary considerations drive copyright law: securing a fair return
for a person's creative labor and stimulating artistic creativity for the public
good.46 However, the primary purpose of the United States courts and legisla-
ture is to promote the general benefits to the public derived from the innova-
tions of others.47 And, when technology renders the Coyright Act ambigu-
ous, it "must be construed in light of this basic purpose.' 8
As one court indicated, "[a]lthough the [Copyright] Act does not spe-
cifically delineate what kind or degree of participation in an infringement is
actionable, it has long been held that one may be liable for copyright in-
fringement even though he has not himself [committed the infringing act]." 49
Accordingly, courts have recognized two theories of secondary liability in
copyright law prior to Grokster.50
40. See generally Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
42. The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
43. Id. at § 102(a).
44. Id. at § 106.
45. Id. at § 501(a).
46. Sony Corp. of Am. v Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32
(1984).
47. Id. at 432.
48. Id.
49. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Man., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-
62 (2d Cir. 1971).
50. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green & Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d
Cir. 1963); Gershwin, 443 F.2d 1159.
2006]
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The Second Circuit promulgated one theory of secondary liability in
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co.5 1 In Shapiro, a record store
owner licensed twenty-three of its locations to a proprietor who engaged in
selling records, including allegedly self-manufactured "bootlegged" copies of
certain records.52 The plaintiffs in Shapiro were copyright holders who sued
the record store owner and proprietor for copyright infringement arising from
the sale of these bootlegged copies.5 3 Ultimately, the proprietor was found
liable for copyright infringement. 54 Although there was no evidence to indi-
cate that the record store owner directly participated in the manufacture and
sale of the bootlegged copies of plaintiff's protected works, the licensing
agreement between the record store owner and the proprietor provided that
the store owner would receive between ten and twelve percent of the proprie-
tor's earnings from the sale of all records.55
The court found the record store owner liable for copyright infringement
under a theory of vicarious liability.5 6 This theory evolved from the doctrine
of respondeat superior, under which an employer is liable for his or her em-
ployee's unlawful actions committed within the scope of employment.5 7 The
court relied on a case that held a dance hall proprietor liable for a band's in-
fringing performance of copyrighted musical composition where the perform-
ance provided the proprietor with enhanced income and the right and ability
to supervise the infringer's activities. 58 This standard applied even if the pro-
prietor did not have knowledge of the compositions to be played or control
over their selection.59 The finding of liability in this case was based on the
rationale that "[t]he protection accorded literary property would be of little
value if ... insulation from payment of damages could be secured ... by
merely refraining from making inquiry.
' 60
The Second Circuit developed an additional theory of secondary liability
in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.6 1 In
Gershwin, the defendant promoted a concert at which copyrighted musical
62compositions were played. The defendant was aware that the copyrighted
compositions would be played at the concert because, prior to the concert, the
defendant produced a list of songs to be performed, which was included in a
51. 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
52. Id. at 305-06.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 306.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 308.
57. See id. at 307.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 308 (alteration in original).
61. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. Id. at 1160.
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program distributed to the audience. 63 The defendant made no attempt to ob-
tain the copyright holder's permission to reproduce the copyrighted composi-
tions, and the copyright holders subsequently sued the defendant for copy-
right infringement.
64
The court held that "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,
may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer." 65 This theory was extracted
from basic tort law, under which "one who knowingly participates or furthers
a tortious act is jointly and severally liable with the prime tortfeasor."66 The
court indicated that the defendant, acting as a promoter who would derive
substantial benefits from the activities of the primary infringers, had a duty to
secure a copyright license prior to the concert.
67
The line between vicarious and contributory liability is blurred.68 Plain-
tiffs frequently file suit under both theories jointly, and they are routinely
merged in decisions. 69 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., the Supreme Court seemingly used the terms interchangeably, stating
that "vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the
concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader prob-
lem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another., 70 In Sony, Universal City Studios and
other television and film copyright holders ("Universal") sued Sony for its
production and distribution of a video cassette recorder ("VCR"), 71 contend-
ing that Sony was liable for VCR users' direct infringement in recording
copyrighted programs.72 The Supreme Court disagreed.73
Examining copyright precedent, the Court found that "in other situations
in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the 'contribu-
tory' infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by
others and had authorized the use without permission from the copyright
63. Id. at 1161.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1162.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1163.
68. Jiarui Liu, Why is Betamax an Anachronism in the Digital Age? Erosion of
the Sony Doctrine and Indirect Copyright Liability of Internet Technologies, 7 VAND.
J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 343, 345-46 (2005); See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984) ("[T]he lines between direct infringe-
ment, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.").
69. Liu, supra note 68, at 345-46.
70. Id. (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 435).
71. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420. For those not readily familiar, a VCR can be used to
record television programs either while the user is away from the television or is
watching another program. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 42 1.
2006]
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owner."74 In the Court's view, Sony was not in a position of control because
the only nexus between Sony and the VCR users was at the moment of sale.
75
The Court then examined whether Sony could have been liable under
the theory that, when it sold VCRs, it had constructive knowledge that its
product would be used to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted mate-
rial.76 To answer this, the Court borrowed a theory from patent law, known as
the staple article of commerce doctrine, which states that "the sale of a 'staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use'
is not contributory infringement."
77
Studies introduced by both parties at trial revealed that approximately
7.3% of VCR recordings were of professional sporting events. This fact was
important because the vast majority of televised sports program copyright
holders did not object to VCR users recording their copyrighted programs.79
The Court found this amount of noninfringing use to be sufficient to satisfy
the staple article of commerce doctrine.80 Specifically, the Court held that
"the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.' 8 1 Ultimately, however, the Court gave little
express guidance into what constituted "substantial noninfringing uses."
8 2
In considering the policy implications of its decision, the Sony Court at-
tempted to balance the "interests of authors and inventors in the control and
exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on
the other hand. ' '8 3 In weighing these two factors, the Court read the Constitu-
tion as indicating that "[c]reative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. ' 84 The Court's reliance on
these policy considerations has caused confusion in the lower courts that have
attempted to apply Sony's standards to similar facts.85
74. Id. at 437.
75. Id. at 437-38.
76. Id. at 439.
77. Id. at 440 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000)). The Court decided that this
was a proper method because patent law and copyright law share a "historic kinship."
Id. at 439.
78. Id. at 424.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 442.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 429.
84. Id. at 431-32.
85. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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The Ninth Circuit applied Sony in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.8 6
In Napster, musical copyright holders ("A & M") sued Napster for contribu-
tory and vicarious copyright infringement.8 7 Napster distributed free software
that employed peer-to-peer file sharing to facilitate the transfer of music files
between its users, allegedly enabling its software users to infringe on A &
M's copyrights.88 Napster provided technical support to assist its users in
indexing and searching for files and also reserved rights to control the content
and use of its network.89 Napster also maintained a search index of available
files on its server.90 The majority of files transferred via Napster were the
plaintiff's copyrighted musical compositions.
91
The Ninth Circuit first examined Napster's liability on a contributory li-
ability standard, which the court defined as attaching liability where "the
defendant engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the in-
fringement." 9 To have been liable under this standard, Napster would have to
have had either actual or constructive knowledge of its users' direct infringe-
ment.93 The court noted that Sony could be read to preclude imputing "the
requisite level of knowledge where the defendants made and sold equipment
capable of both infringing and 'substantial noninfringing uses."' 94 The Ninth
Circuit extended the substantial noninfringing use defense only to cases based
on constructive knowledge, and held that where there is evidence of actual
knowledge of direct infringement, a product manufacturer will be liable for
contributory infringement when its product is used to commit direct in-
fringement, regardless of whether the product has substantial noninfringing
uses.
9 5
The record indicated that Napster was actually aware of its users' direct
infringement. 96 Furthermore, Napster had reserved the right to block content
and users from the system and had failed to remove copyrighted files when it
knew they were on the network.97 Because of this, the court did not examine
whether Napster's product was capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
98
The Court held that Napster materially contributed to its users' direct in-
86. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
87. Id. at 1011.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1012.
91. Id. at 1013-14.
92. Id. at 1019.
93. Id. at 1020.
94. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984)).
95. Id. at 1021.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1022.
98. Id. at 1021.
2006]
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fringement by providing technical support on sharing copyrighted music files
and was thus liable under the contributory infringement standard. 99
In considering whether Napster could be vicariously liable for its users'
direct infringement, the Court held that Sony did not apply to vicarious liabil-
ity theories because that issue was not before the Sony court.It° The Court
read the use of the words "vicarious liability" in Sony broadly, meaning that
"vicarious liability" was meant to refer only to secondary liability theories
generally and not specifically to the vicarious liability theory of copyright
law. 10 ' The Court determined two reasons why Napster could be vicariously
liable for its users infringing acts.' °2 First, Napster derived substantial finan-
cial benefit from its users' infringing activities. 103 In the Court's opinion, the
number of users was directly related to the number of copyrighted files avail-
able on the system.104 And, as the number of copyrighted files available for
download increased, so too did the number of users and the subsequent finan-
cial benefit Napster derived from advertisers. 10 5 Thus, Napster's supervision
of the network presented a second basis for a finding of vicarious liability.1
0 6
In In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, the Seventh Circuit interpreted
Sony differently than the Ninth Circuit. 10 7 The plaintiffs (numerous record
companies that owned the majority of popular American music copyrights)
sued Aimster (a software company similar to Napster) for contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement.'08 Aimster's software included both a tuto-
rial that showed users how to download songs and a service that would auto-
matically download the most frequently transferred songs to the user's com-
puter. 0 9 The tutorial used only copyrighted songs in its demonstration and the
download service almost exclusively downloaded the plaintiffs copyrighted
compositions." 1
0
The plaintiffs argued that Sony only applied as a defense to a charge of
contributory infringement where there is nothing "more than a mere showing
that a product may be used for infringing purposes," or in other words, where
99. Id. at 1022.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1022-23.




106. Id. As previously mentioned, Napster offered technical support to its users in
downloading copyrighted files, reserved the rights to monitor the use of its system,
and maintained a server that enabled users to search for files. Id. at 1012, 1023.
107. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
108. Id. at 645.
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the defendant does not have actual knowledge of direct infringement."' The
Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, which it thought closely mirrored the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Napster that "actual knowledge of specific infring-
ing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory in-
fringer."' 12
Instead, the Seventh Circuit read Sony as "unwilling to allow copyright
holders to prevent infringement effectuated by means of a new technology at
the price of possibly denying noninfringing consumers the benefit of the
technology."' 13 To clarify, the Court explained that this did not mean that a
distributor of a product used solely for infringing uses could dodge contribu-
tory liability merely because the product could have substantial noninfringing
uses. 14 Instead, the Court required Aimster to present evidence that its soft-
ware had actually been used for something other than infringement." 5 The
Court refined this standard by holding that a distributor of a product with
substantial noninfringing uses that had nonetheless been used to infringe
copyright could escape liability only where the distributor could "show that it
would have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least
reduce substantially the infringing uses.""
Aimster also diverged from Napster on the issue of whether the stan-
dards set forth in Sony were applicable to allegations of vicarious copyright
infringement. "7 In the Seventh Circuit's words, "[h]ow far the doctrine of
vicarious liability extends is uncertain .... [b]ut the [Sony] Court, treating
vicarious and contributory infringement interchangeably, held that Sony was
not a vicarious infringer.""
' 18
Aimster made clear that the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit in two respects. First, the courts reached incongruent holdings on
whether a finding of liability based on a product distributor's actual knowl-
111. Id. at 649. This argument is comparable to the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Napster that when actual knowledge of direct copyright infiingement is present, a
defendant cannot use the staple article of commerce doctrine from Sony to escape
contributory liability. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th
Cir. 2001).
112. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649. The Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Napster. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 651.
115. Id. at 652. The court listed a handful of noninfringing uses that could possi-
bly have existed that Aimster failed to support with evidence. Id. Since the Seventh
Circuit was only deciding whether the trial court's extension of a preliminary injunc-
tion to plaintiffs was proper, the evidentiary record had not been fully developed. Id.
Thus, the examples cited in the opinion were merely postulates from Judge Posner
and not actual evidence present by Aimster. Id. at 652-53.
116. Id. at 653.
117. Id. at 654.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
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edge that the distributed product was being used to directly infringe copy-
rights could be overridden if that product had or was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.1 19 Second, the Seventh Circuit clearly rejected the Ninth
Circuit's belief that Sony was inapplicable in vicarious liability analyses.
20
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. gave the Supreme Court
an opportunity to address the confusion over Sony that had arisen in lower
courts. 
12 1
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Grokster, the Supreme Court was faced with clarifying when a prod-
uct distributor could be held liable for the infringing acts of a third party us-
ing that product.' 22 The Court was cautious to respect the "sound balance
between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copy-
right protection and promoting innovation in new communication technolo-
gies by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement."' 123 The
Court believed copyright law to be an "exercise in managing the trade-off."' 
24
Implicit in this trade-off was the Court's fear "that imposing liability, not
only on infringers but on distributors of software based on its potential for
unlawful use, could limit further development of beneficial technologies."'
125
Notwithstanding the Court's clear appreciation for the cause of techno-
logical innovation, the Court believed that "[t]he argument for imposing indi-
rect liability in this case is ... a powerful one ... given the number of in-
fringing downloads that occur every day using StreamCast's and Grokster's
software."' 26 This belief was founded on the presupposition that imposing
either contributory or vicarious liability in this case may have been the only
way to protect the copyright holder's rights, as suing each of the countless
direct infringers would clearly be impractical, if not impossible.127
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Souter attempted to explain why
the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony in deciding Grokster.128 Because the Ninth
Circuit "found the StreamCast and Grokster software capable of substantial
lawful use, it concluded on the basis of its reading of Sony that neither com-
pany could be held liable, since there was no showing that their software,
being without any central server, afforded them knowledge of specific unlaw-
119. Id. at 649.
120. Id. at 654.
121. See generally MGM v. Grokster, Ltd.,125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2775.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2776.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2778.
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ful uses."'129 Dismissing this rationale, Justice Souter said "[it is enough to
note that the Ninth Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding
of Sony and to leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that
may be required."'130 Instead of addressing the issues disputed by lower courts
applying Sony, the Supreme Court adopted inducement as a new theory of
secondary liability for copyright infringement.'
31
Grokster adopted the inducement theory from patent law for the same
reasons that the Sony Court borrowed the staple article of commerce doc-
trine. 132 Under the inducement theory, one induces another to commit copy-
right infringement by enticement or persuasion, as by advertising. 33 The
Court explained that advertising a product's infringing uses or instructing
users how to use a product for infringement "overcomes the law's reluctance
to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable
for some lawful use[].' 34 The Court reconciled this theory with Sony, stating
that "where evidence goes beyond a product's characteristics or the knowl-
edge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions
directed to promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not pre-
clude liability."' 35 This standard, in the Court's view, did not compromise
legitimate commerce or discourage lawful technological innovation.' Con-
sequently, the Court found that inducement exists only in cases where pur-
poseful, culpable expression or conduct is present.'3
The record clearly showed that both Grokster and StreamCast acted cul-
pably by inducing their software users to commit copyright infringement. 3 8
The Court found the evidence notable in three ways.' 39 First, both companies
demonstrated an intention to satisfy the demand for a vehicle for copyright
infringement left by Napster's dissolution. 14 Second, this evidence of unlaw-
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2778-79.
131. Id. at 2779-80.
132. Id. at 2780. The Sony Court borrowed the staple article of commerce doctrine
from patent law because patent law and copyright law share a "historic kinship." Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,439 (1984).




136. Id. at 2780.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2780-81. More specifically, the Court held that MGM had at least pre-
sented enough evidence to survive summary judgment. Id.
139. Id. at 2781.
140. Id. Both companies advertised to Napster's previous users that their software
could be used in a manner similar to Napster's. Id. StreamCast did this with its
OpenNap software that could be used by existing Napster users. Id. Grokster did this
by supplanting internal codes in its own website that led intemet users searching for
20061
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ful objective was reinforced by evidence that neither company attempted to
filter or police their software's use in a way that would diminish infringing
activity.141 And third, since both companies distributed their software free-of-
charge, their profits came solely from advertising revenues. 142 In the Court's
opinion, this evidence made the companies' unlawful objective "unmistak-
able.' 1
43
The companies' liability under an inducement theory also required a
showing that their software users had actually infringed on MGM's copy-
rights.' Although the Court did not definitively determine whether or not
this had occurred, the factual dispute was sufficient for MGM to survive sum-
mary judgment.145 For these reasons, the Court overruled the Ninth Circuit
and remanded the case to the district court for a finding consistent with its
opinion.
146
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. 147 Justice Ginsburg agreed with Grok-
ster's outcome, but believed that a new liability theory was unnecessary be-
cause this case could be resolved by applying Sony's principles to a contribu-
tory liability theory. 148 Ginsburg found Grokster markedly different from
Sony because there was "little beyond anecdotal evidence of noninfringing
uses" for Grokster's and StreamCast's software. 149 Even though the compa-
nies' software could have been or was used for a large number of noninfring-ing uses, Ginsburg argued that those uses were dwarfed by the extreme
"Napster" to come to Grokster's website. Id. Both companies also responded affirma-
tively to e-mails seeking guidance from uses on downloading and playing copyrighted
files. Id. at 2772. In StreamCast's case, a large number of internal documents also
conveyed its intention to induce infringement. Id. at 2781. Examples of such docu-
ments are discussed in Part II.
141. Id. at 2781.
142. Id. at 2781-82. This was important because the record indicated that advertis-
ing revenue increased proportionately with the extent of the software's use. Id. Since
the software was used predominately to infringe on copyrighted material, an increase
in use led to a corresponding increase in infringement and, subsequently, the compa-
nies' profits. Id. The Court explained that this alone would not be determinative of





146. Id. at 2782-83.
147. Id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
148. Id. See supra Part III (discussing contributory liability for copyright in-
fringement).
149. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2785. Justice Ginsburg believed the Ninth Circuit
relied too heavily on evidence presented by Grokster and StreamCast that offered
speculative proof of noninfringing uses. Id. Furthermore, Ginsburg believed much of
that evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Id.
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amount of infringement.'5° Ginsburg posited that the Ninth Circuit had given
too much consideration to the potential noninfringing uses of peer-to-peer
technology generally (which was not at issue in this case) and had not paid
enough attention to the potential noninfringing uses for the companies' soft-
ware specifically (which was at issue in this case).' 5 1 Because the record
yielded significant evidence that the companies' software did not have sub-
stantial noninfringing uses, Justice Ginsburg speculated that, on remand, this
case would likely be resolved by summary judgment for MGM. 152
Justice Breyer filed a separate concurrence, joined by Justice Stevens
and Justice O'Connor, in which he agreed with the Court's opinion, but dis-
agreed with Justice Ginsburg's application of Sony.' 53 Breyer believed that
Grokster could be decided without revisiting Sony and reasoned that Sony's
staple article of commerce doctrine indicated that a showing of substantial
noninfringing uses was alone enough to constitute a sufficient basis for re-
jecting the imposition of secondary liability. 154 And when the software at
issue in Grokster was considered in light of Sony, the software actually con-
formed to the standard Sony held as sufficient for a rejection of liability' 55
The record in Sony indicated that approximately 9% of VCR uses were nonin-
fringing.' 56 Similarly, the evidence in Grokster showed that approximately
10% of the software's uses were noninfringing. 157 Justice Breyer therefore
believed that Grokster and StreamCast could not be liable for contributory
infringement under a strict Sony analysis, as the companies' software clearly
had a percentage of noninfringing uses that satisfied Sony!'
58
Breyer read Sony as seeking "to protect not the Groksters of this world.
but the development of technology more generally."'159 Breyer believed that
because the record in Grokster indicated elements of inducement that were
not present in Sony, the Court's unanimous opinion was a good way to pre-
serve the protections of Sony while still finding liability in Grokster.160
150. Id. at 2786.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2786-87.
153. Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2788.
155. Id. at 2788-89.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2789.
158. Id. at 2789-90. Furthermore, the record revealed a significant future market
for noninfringing uses for peer-to-peer networks such as those offered by Grokster
and StreamCast. Id. at 2790.
159. Id.
160. Id. In Justice Breyer's opinion, Sony did not need to be rehashed for exami-
nation until it could be shown that Sony no longer correctly balanced copyright and
new technology interests. Id. at 2791. Justice Breyer noted three considerations that
would need to be determined to indicate when this had occurred. Id. The first such
consideration is whether Sony had "worked to' protect new technology." Id. Breyer
2006]
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V. COMMENT
While the addition of the inducement theory of secondary liability to
copyright law benefits copyright holders seeking to protect their rights, the
Supreme Court missed an opportunity in Grokster to clarify two ambiguities
remaining from Sony: first, whether the Sony staple article of commerce doc-
trine is a defense to a charge of vicarious copyright infringement, and second,
whether a product distributor's actual knowledge that the distributed product
is being used to infringe copyright can be overridden by the Sony staple arti-
cle of commerce doctrine.' With the Ninth and Seventh Circuits in dispute
over these issues, it seemed likely that the Supreme Court would resolve the
dispute in Grokster.162 However, the Court avoided answering these questions
by adopting inducement as a new theory for secondary copyright liability.
The Court's failure to remedy the ambiguous standards set forth in Sony
could have negative effects.
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit stated its belief that Sony did not apply to
vicarious infringement cases because that issue was not before the Sony
Court. 16 3 However, the Seventh Circuit rejected that interpretation of Sony
because, in the court's opinion, Sony used the terms "contributory" and "vi-
carious" interchangeably. 164 This difference of opinion between the courts is
important in infringement cases because, although they are similar and fre-
believed that it had, and noted four reasons why. Id. at 2791-92. First, "Sony's rule is
clear." Id. at 2791 (emphasis omitted). The rule allows products "capable of substan-
tial noninfringing uses" to be distributed with the assurance that the distributor will
not face massive monetary liability unless the product has no other real function than
(or is specifically intended for) copyright infringement. Id. Second, "Sony's rule is
strongly technology protecting." Id. (emphasis omitted). The rule favors new technol-
ogy and makes it difficult for courts to find secondary liability. Id. Third, "Sony's rule
is forward looking." Id. at 2792 (emphasis omitted). The rule does not confine analy-
sis of current noninfringing uses, but allows inquiry into a product's capability for
substantial noninfringing uses. Id. Finally, Sony's rule is mindful of limitations judges
may have in deciding technology related issues. Id. Breyer's second consideration for
determining when to revisit Sony was "whether a modified Sony rule (or a strict inter-
pretation) would significantly weaken the law's ability to protect new technology." Id.
He believed that a modified Sony standard would have potentially stifling effects on
technological innovation. Id. at 2792-93. Breyer's third and final consideration for
deciding when Sony needed reexamination was "whether a positive copyright impact
would outweigh any technology-related loss." Id. at 2793. Breyer found the answer to
this consideration "far from clear." Id.
161. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). See also supra
Part III (providing a discussion of these two cases).
162. John Tehranian, The High Court in Cyberspace: A Preview of MGM Studios
v. Grokster, 18-APR UTAH B.J. 24, 28 (2005).
163. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
164. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 654.
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quently intertwined,165 the standards for contributory and vicarious infringe-
ment are not one in the same.' 66 Vicarious liability for copyright infringement
stands when one has the right and ability to supervise infringing activity and
also has a financial interest in that activity. 167 On the other hand, contributory
liability can be found when a person with knowledge of another's infringing
activities induces, causes, or materially contributes to those activities.168 The
knowledge requirement is notably absent from the vicarious liability stan-
dard.' 6
9
One can reasonably envision a copyright infringement case with a de-
fendant that lacks the knowledge required for contributory infringement but
meets the requirements for a finding of vicarious liability. In such a case, the
availability of the Sony staple article of commerce doctrine as a defense to
vicarious infringement would depend on the forum in which the case was
tried. If the case was tried in the Ninth Circuit, a vicarious liability defendant
could not raise the Sony defense, but the exact opposite would be true in the
Seventh Circuit.' 70 Such incongruity encourages litigants to forum shop for
venues that interpret Sony in their favor. Although it may seem improbable
that a modem judge would not seize on this deceitful tactic, the emergence of
the internet has blurred once clear jurisdictional doctrines,17' and entities that
exist predominantly online could potentially be subject to jurisdiction in a
number of venues.
172
Even if forum shopping, in its strictest sense, is not encouraged, a lack
of clarity between jurisdictions, at minimum, gives plaintiffs an incentive to
engage in "massive litigation of the same issues against multiple defendants
in different jurisdictions.', 173 The presumed aim of such a practice would be
to achieve a "mean" outcome, in which the favorable decisions offset the
165. Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright
Doctrines of Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War
between Content and Destructive Technologies, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 141,234 (2005).
166. (176) See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304
(2d Cir. 1963); Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
167. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
168. Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
169. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
170. Compare A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th
Cir. 2001), with In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003).
171. Katherine C. Sheehan, Predicting the Future: Personal Jurisdiction for the
Twenty-First Century, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 385,437 (1998).
172. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme,
379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446 (3d
Cir. 2003); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); Young v. New Haven Ad-
vocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants,
Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316
(9th Cir. 1998); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
173. Grossman, supra note 165, at 224.
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unfavorable ones. Either scenario produces the undesirable result of burden-
ing courts with misplaced and duplicative litigation.
Grokster also failed to remedy a similarly undesirable inconsistency be-
tween the Ninth and Seventh Circuits on the issue of whether a product dis-
tributor's actual knowledge that the distributed product is being used to in-
fringe copyright can be overridden by the Sony staple article of commerce
doctrine. 74 In Napster, the Ninth Circuit held that contributory liability based
on a showing of a product distributor's actual knowledge that the product was
being used for infringement could not be outweighed by a product's use for
or capability of substantial noninfringing use. 175 The Seventh Circuit clearly
rejected that principle, favoring a more economic approach.' 76 The court was
"unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by
means of a new technology at the price of possibly denying noninfringing
consumers the benefit of the technology."' 77 Finding otherwise, in the Sev-
enth Circuit's opinion, would have been contrary to copyright law's basic
purpose of disseminating beneficial technological advances to the general
public.
78
The split of authority left unresolved by Grokster is inefficient. 79 For
example, one commentator envisioned a situation in which an innocent soft-
ware company learns of its product's use to infringe musical copyrights when
notified of as much by the copyright holder record company.180 Under the
Ninth Circuit's heavy reliance on actual knowledge, the software company
would be liable for contributory infringement if it was able to stop or reduce
the infringement and chose not to do so, regardless of whether the product
had substantial noninfiinging uses.18 1 The Seventh Circuit would likely con-
clude the opposite if sufficient evidence of the product's actual and potential
noninfringing uses was introduced.18 2 These disparate outcomes create ineffi-
cient results. In the Ninth Circuit, the formerly innocent, but now infringing,
software company would lose any venture capital invested in software devel-
opment, which, in the case of high-tech companies, might total hundreds of
174. See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d 1004; Aimster, 334 F.3d 643. See also discussion
supra Part IV. The Ninth Circuit even pinpointed this discrepancy in the instant litiga-
tion, but was unable to repeal its prior holding, as it was not sitting en banc. MGM v.
Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004).
175. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
176. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Grossman, supra note 165, at 224.
180. Id. at 234.
181. Id. The choice not to remedy the situation would likely satisfy the material
contribution prong of contributory infringement. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Co-
lumbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
182. See Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 at 649.
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millions of dollars. 1 3 But in the Seventh Circuit, the software company is
likely to escape liability, which could mean an equally severe loss to the re-
cord company. 184 In either situation, the companies are likely to expend mas-
sive litigation costs to yield highly unpredictable results.185 Because Grokster
did not address which of these standards is correct, both the unpredictability
and subsequent inefficiency remain.
VI. CONCLUSION
With six of the nine justices in Grokster disagreeing on how to apply
Sony, it is clear that Sony presents confusing standards, 186 and the Supreme
Court may have passed on a viable opportunity to clarify inconsistency in the
lower courts.
The Court has held that "[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports [the
Court's] consistent deference to Congress when major technological innova-
tions alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitu-
tional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such
new technology."'18 7 In light of this, it is possible that the Grokster Court ab-
stained from resolving Sony's ambiguities in hopes of a legislative remedy.
However, this would be an odd result given the Court's past willingness to
create doctrines of copyright law not recognized by the legislature.'
88
What can more likely be said of the result in Grokster is that the Court's
decision represented a shift in copyright law's desired balance between secur-
ing a fair return for a person's creative labor and ensuring that the general
public has access to the benefits of technological innovation.189 Whereas Sony
once favored benefit to the general public by allowing a device consistently
used for infringement to be nonetheless disseminated,' 9° Grokster swung the
183. Grossman, supra note 165, at 225-26.
184. Id. at 225. According to the recording industry, copyright infringement costs
the industry billions in sales each year. Id.
185. Id. It is important to note that it is the unpredictability generally, and not
either of the specific results from the two jurisdictions, that is inefficient. Id. at 227.
186. Compare Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, MGM v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2783 (2005), with Justice Breyer's concurrence. Id. at 2787.
187. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
188. None of the three secondary liability theories (contributory, vicarious, and,
now, inducement) are expressly recognized by Congress. See Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000). In 2004, an amendment to include inducement in the Copyright
Act, the Induce Act, S. Res. 2560, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004) was proposed in the United
States Senate, but the proposal stalled in committee. Timothy K. Andrews, Control
Content, Not Innovation: Why Hollywood Should Embrace Peer-to-Peer Technology
Despite the MGM v. Grokster Battle, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 383,420-21 (2005).
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pendulum back to protect copyright holders from obviously egregious in-
fringement.' 9' In the future, courts' favor for either side of this scale is likely
to fluctuate until copyright law most closely resembles the legal abstraction
of a true balance.
EvAN F. FITTs
191. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764.
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